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Statecraft, Trade and the Order of States
Ari Afilalo and Dennis Patterson*
In 1989, Francis Fukuyama announced "the end of history."' Fukuyama
was not the first to make this bold claim-Hegel had said as much about
Napoleon's victory at Jena in 1806.2 But, unlike Hegel's, Fukuyama's bold claim
was not a declaration of the triumph of the state-nation;3 rather, he was declaring
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Daniela Caruso, Jeff Dunoff, Andrew Halpin, Claire Kelly, and Jefferson White for comments on
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Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistoy?
, 
Nati Interest 3 (Summer 1989). As he had for so many
intellectuals of his generation, Fukuyama's Hegel came by way of Alexandre Kojeve. See
Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit (Basic
1969). For a general discussion, see Shadia B. Drury, Alexandre Kojeve: The Roots of Postmodern Politics
179-98 (Palgrave MacMillan 1994).
2 See Fukuyama, Nad Interest at 5-6 (cited in note I). See also <http://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Battle-ofJena> (visited Oct 28, 2005).
3 The state-nation is the constitutional manifestation of a state characterized by a mobilization of a
nation (a national, ethnocultural group) to benefit the State. ("State" as used herein is defined in
note 4 below.) This form of the State, exemplified by Napoleonic France, dominated Europe and
America in the nineteenth century and ultimately gave rise to the modern nation-state with the
advent of World War I. For a general description, see Philip Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles 144-204
(Knopf 2002). The classical definition of the nation-state, on the other hand, refers to "a relatively
homogenous group of people with a feeling of common nationality living within the defined
boundaries of an independent and sovereign state: a state containing one as opposed to several
nationalities." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1505 (1986). As explained throughout this
Article, we use the term "nation-state," at times interchangeably with "modern state," to denote
an era where the fundamental elements of Statecraft involved a State that harnessed itself to the
nation, legitimized itself through the guarantee of the nation's welfare, adhered to relatively strong
hallmarks of sovereignty and operated in an international system that valued balance of powers. It
is of course common for modern nation-states to include discrete minorities who are an integral
part of the collectivity-state but do not necessarily belong to the dominant ethnicity. For our
purposes, however, this nuance is irrelevant in that our use of the term nation-state is a shorthand
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the end of the great struggle between democracy, fascism and communism.
After the defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II, and following the fall of
the Iron Curtain, Fukuyama believed that democracy had triumphed and would,
henceforth, be the preferred model for State4 government.
5
It now appears that, like Hegel, Fukuyama was mistaken in his claim for
the end of history. While it is true that democracy defeated fascism and
communism in the ideological struggle for political dominance, the State as we
know it continues to evolve. History has not ended. The story continues, and as
has been the case before, it is the nature of the State6 that is changing
Identifying these changes, gauging their significance, and evaluating their
relationship with respect to other features of the relations between states is
central to understanding how and why the State continues to evolve.
for the hallmarks of Statecraft that are associated with a particular period and is not intended to
address in any way the issues related to the rights of minorities in nation-states or like questions.
4 We use the word "state" in two different senses. When we write "State," we are referring to the
conceptual political entity that has evolved in the Western world over roughly the last five
hundred years. See J.S. McClelland, A Histogy of Western Political Thought 280 (Routledge 1996)
(dating the birth of the modern state at 1500). The State is manifested in many territorially and
politically distinct "states," like Italy or the Republic of Latvia. When we refer to these individual
states, we refer to them as a "state." For discussion of the various phases of the State's
development, and their relation to a variety of constitutional orders, see Bobbitt, The Shield of
Achilles at 69-347 (cited in note 3).
5 According to Fukuyama, the liberal democratic model soundly beat fascism and communism
because, simply put, it was a better idea. The liberal democratic model had no problem besting the
fascist ideology of expansionism and racial superiority. In time, it defeated the Marxist ideology-
in part because the growth of a strong and expansive middle class, resulting from (among other
factors) the welfare policies of the nation-state, had radically changed the social reality in which
Marx wrote. In the end, Fukuyama argued, all good government would be organized along the
lines of the liberal democratic model, which would be applied to govern an ethnic or otherwise
discrete nation and would protect the rights of minorities. See Fukuyama, The End of Histogy at 3-
18 (cited in note 1).
6 The State is both a political institution and an idea. Two of the defining features of the modem
form of the State-sovereignty and control of power-are connected to two larger dimensions of
the State, which we will call the internal and the external dimensions. The most obvious aspect of
sovereignty is control over geography. Sovereignty is an attribute of states and sovereignty matters
most in relations between states. See G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right 331 (Oxford 1975)
(T.M. Knox, trans) ("[E]very state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbours.").
7 Some see the "end" of the State marked by a transition to other, more complicated organizing
forms. See Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State vii (Cambridge 1999) ("Globally
speaking, the international system is moving away from an assembly of distinct, territorial,
sovereign, legally equal states toward different, more hierarchical, and in many ways more
complicated structures."). See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 32 (Princeton 2004)
("The conception of the unitary state is a fiction.").
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Recent scholarship on the State has largely focused on foreign policy-in
particular, the "strategic" aspects of relations between states.8 One of the more
interesting claims in this regard is that the very nature of the State (what we call
Statecraft) has evolved in response to developments unique to the twentieth
century. 9 These developments, which include the commodification of weapons
of mass destruction ("WNMD"), the diminished significance of sovereignty, and
the globalization of health and environmental threats,' ° have engendered a new
approach to strategy." Many scholars have devoted their attention to changes in
strategy and its relation to the continuing evolution of the State.'2 We agree that
the State is changing. We further agree that these changes require a rethinking of
strategic defense in a world of asymmetric warfare and global networked
terrorism. 3 However, we do not intend to add to the literature on strategy. Our
project draws upon this literature, but is distinctly different.
Our project examines the extent to which the global trade system 4 should
respond to fundamental shifts in the nature of the State and of international
8 For insightful works exploring the strategic dimensions of Statecraft, see Robert Cooper, The
Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenyfirst Centugy (Atlantic 2003); Robert Kagan, Of
Paradise and Power America and Europe in the New World Order (Atlantic 2003); Bobbitt, The Shield of
Achilles at 5-17 (cited in note 3).
9 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles at 677-714 (cited in note 3). The five developments are: (1) an
international system of trade and finance that promotes exchange of goods and talent, and the
free movement of capital; (2) threats that do not observe national boundaries (for example, AIDS
and SARS); (3) loss of state control over culture; (4) commodification of weapons of mass
destruction; and (5) a global system of human rights which imposes legal rules on nation-states,
whether or not they have ratified them. Id at xxii.
10 For a general discussion, see K.J. Keith, Sovereignly at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Fundamental or
Outmoded? 63 Camb L J 581 (2004). For a discussion of sovereignty in the context of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"), see Kent Jones, Who's Afraid of the WTO? 92-104 (Oxford 2004). A
strong defense of sovereignty in the context of international law and constitutional government is
found in Jeremy A. Rabkin, Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign
States (Princeton 2005).
11 See Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duy to Prevent, 83 Foreign Aff 136-50 (Jan-Feb
2004) (arguing for pre-emptive military action in a world of global terrorism and WMD). See also
Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century 98 (Cornell 2004)
("The existence of WMD in the hands of non-state actors poses a new and extremely severe
type of security problem that would almost certainly justify intervention on the part of a country
threatened in that manner.").
12 See Cooper, The Breaking of Nations at 3 (cited in note 8) ("What has been emerging into the
daylight since 1989 is not a rearrangement of the old system but a new system. Behind this lies a
new form of statehood.').
13 See, for example, Philip Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom and Securiy: Winning Without War 37-87 (MIT
2003) (discussing terrorism, intelligence, and "war" after 9/11).
14 By the "global trade system" we mean the structures and practices of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and WTO. See generally <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/thewtoe.
htm> (visited Sept 18, 2005).
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relations. 5 Our thesis is that just as the strategic and foreign policies of states are
linked to their internal constitutional order, 6 the trade policy of states is another
external dimension of the State also connected to the State's internal order. The
experience of the twentieth century shows that states must acknowledge
overarching structural changes within their domestic spheres, then identify, in a
timely fashion, how these shifts affect their interaction with the rest of the
international economic community. In turn, states must adjust external trade
policy objectives and strategies with respect to the international community to
accord with their intrinsic political and ideological goals. The failure to do so at
the appropriate time will hobble the internal economic health of states and may
also hamper free states in struggles against totalitarian movements.
Our Article proceeds in three principal parts. In Part I, we explore the
extent to which the State continues to evolve in the twenty-first century. We
draw on the literature discussing strategy to identify the hallmarks of Statecraft
among the states that dominated the trading world after World War I-in
particular the modern liberal democracies of Europe, the United States, and
Japan. Part II argues that, just as law and strategy evolve through an
interdependent and dynamic relationship, Statecraft and the international
commercial order of states engender each other's evolution through an
interactive process. The domestic constitutional architecture of the State'--such
as its organization around a nation and its legitimization through the promotion
of that nation's welfare-has a profound influence on the ordering of the
international trade system and the type of fundamental questions (such as the
"linkage" of trade and social regulation) that will face each generation. At the
same time, gradual shifts in the foundational rules of the international trade
system and in patterns of international economic activity (such as the rise of a
new set of international economic actors or transformations in currency
markets) affect the ability of the State to maintain its domestic Statecraft and
15 For a general discussion, see Miles Kahler and David A. Lake, eds, Governance in a Global Economy:
PoliticalAuthority in Transition (Princeton 2003); Jean-Marie Guthenno, The End of the Nation-State
(Minnesota 1995) (Victoria Elliot, trans); Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of
Regional Economies (The Free Press 1995).
16 The internal constitutional order is expressed through law, both public and private. Bobbitt, The
Shield ofAcbilles at xxiii (cited in note 3).
17 While we do discuss both current and historical events, this essay is about ideas. Mindful that
"[i]deas are always both lagging and leading indicators of reality," we attempt to anticipate coming
events with ideas that will accommodate a future toward which the states that comprise the world
trading system are already moving. H.W. Brands, Ideas and Foreign Affairs, in Robert Schulzinger,
ed, A Companion to American Foreign Relations 1, 9 (Blackwell 2002).
18 See Part II below for an explanation of the meaning of constitutional choices, as used in this
context.
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tend to transform the internal order of the State. We illustrate our theoretical
argument with an analysis of the Bretton Woods order.
In Part III, we explain how comparative advantage as the animating
principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")19 has set in
motion fundamental shifts in Statecraft which, in turn, necessitate the
introduction of new concepts and language into the international trade order.
We argue that a new constitutional moment is needed-albeit one different in
kind from Bretton Woods's drastic departure from past policies and wholesale
adoption of comparative advantage as one of the foundational norms of the
system-and, with it, a new trade norm for states, which we identify as
"enablement of global economic opportunity." We complete our argument with
a description of a new set of global institutional settings for world trade,
institutions that will enable us to make sense of current changes as we approach
an uncertain future.
The gravamen of our argument is three-fold: (i) History never ends, and
the interdependent mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states will, in each
generation, engender the need for revision of the international commercial order
and necessitate a new constitutional moment; (ii) Theoreticians and planners of
trade can predict not only the issues that a trade system will generate at any
moment in history, but also decipher and anticipate the contours of the next
generation-to do this, however, they must understand the mechanics of
Statecraft and the order of states; (iii) The new order ushered in by each
constitutional moment is bound to set in motion transformative mechanisms
that plant the seeds of the succeeding generation. Our goal is to outline the
contours of the new constitutional moment that we believe is needed, as well as
the institutional and normative redirection of trade towards which we believe
observers and drivers of trade should orient themselves.
I. THE END OF HISTORY . . . AND ITS CONTINUATION
The Second World War ended with the demise of fascism. The fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of communism and, with it, the triumph of
democracy.20 Fukuyama's end of history begins in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin
Wall. According to Robert Cooper, 1989 did not mark the end of history, but
rather set the stage for the emergence of a new form of the State-the "post-
19 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat A-11, TIAS 1700, 55 UN Treaty Ser 194 (1947)
(hereinafter GATT).
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modern state."'" Philip Bobbitt similarly rejects Fukuyama's claim, and views
1989 as merely a step in the evolution of the State. He identifies the new form of
the State as the "market-state" which, he argues, will succeed the nation-state.22
These two theorists of the State agree on a number of defining characteristics of
the new form of State that, in their view, confirm the continuing evolution of
the State. Further, their theories point to a nexus and an interplay between the
inner face of the State (its constitutional order) and its strategic foreign policy
and military objectives. Bobbitt and Cooper are right about the State,23 but the
story they tell is incomplete.
The State has both internal and external dimensions. The external
dimension of states-their relations with other states-is expressed in two
aspects. The first is manifested through strategy, the most obvious example of
which is war.24 The second expression of the external dimension of the State is
through trade and commercial relations. The modern era of strategy, which
ended around 1989, spanned the better part of the twentieth century-
commencing with World War I, continuing through the defeat of fascism, and
ending with the fall of communism. During that period, liberal democracies
organized themselves as modern welfare nation-states. 25 A commitment to
sovereignty drove the internal and external dimensions of the modern state.26
Modern states adhered to absolutist notions of sovereignty in their internal
policy choices and external policy and military objectives.27 The notion of
sovereignty was intricately linked to the nation as a constitutive feature of the
State, to welfare as the legitimating drive of the State, and to the balance of
powers as a key component of the State's external strategy.
Sovereignty was inextricably tied to the idea of the nation. The essential
goal of the State was to protect the nation against external threats and to provide
for its internal welfare. The nation was sovereign, and although it was largely
ethnic, it defined itself by its physical borders and the population it inherited
throughout centuries of evolution. Having grown and become more powerful,
21 See Cooper, The Breaking of Nations at 26 (cited in note 8) (attributing the beginning of "post-
modern Europe" to The Treaty of Rome (1957) and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in
Europe).
22 See Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles at 611-39 (cited in note 3).
23 Even Marxists affirm the evolution of the State over claims for its demise. See Antonio Negri and
Michael Hardt, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (Penguin 2004); Antonio Negri
and Michael Hardt, Empire (Harvard 2001).
24 Strategic decisions are connected to the inner dimension of the State through law.
25 For ease of reference, we will refer to these as "modem states."
26 Consider Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles at xxv-xxvii (cited in note 3).
27 Id.
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the modern state underwent a metamorphosis from state-nation, a state
supported by a nation, to nation-state, a state supporting its nation. The primary
means of support was the notion of welfare-coupled with a system of
protection of minority rights or rights deemed fundamental-as its legitimating
objective. Welfare and the maintenance of the domestic order were the principal
features of the internal dimension of the State. Europe and the United States
differed in their domestic approach to providing welfare to the citizenry. Europe
had a stronger set of social entitlements, such as unemployment benefits, large
family allowances, strong employee protection, and early and generous
retirement benefits. For several reasons, some historical and some structural, the
United States did not adopt social entitlement packages to the same extent as
Europe.28 Nevertheless, as in Europe, the legitimacy of the US government
depended in substantial part on its promotion of the welfare of large middle and
working classes.29
Lastly, the notion of balance of powers was linked to the concepts of
sovereignty and of the nation as the interlocutor of the state in its quest for
legitimacy. In the modern system, nation-states with strong sovereign powers
maintained international order by balancing each other's powers. Balance of
powers, rather than the hegemonic domination of an empire or superpower, was
the preferred method of achieving order.3° The modern world viewed states as
equal citizens of a global society. The concept of hegemony was antithetical to
this worldview, however fictional or detached from reality it might have been.
Thus, it was the alternative, an order based on balance among equals (or a
substantial group of equals), that came to dominate the Western world in the
modern era.
The modern state is gradually declining in various parts of the world,
particularly in Europe. To be sure, the nations of the world continue to
substantially adhere to territorial and constitutional Statecraft of the kind that
emerged in the twentieth century. However, a foundational transformative shift
similar to the one that brought about the nation-state in the twentieth century is
taking place. Notions of borders and sovereignty are gradually losing the central
role they played in the modern era. We are witnessing a correlative diminution in
the effectiveness and importance of maintaining balance among equals on the
28 For discussion and possible explanation, see John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolridge, The Right
Naion: Conservalive Power in America (Penguin 2004).
29 Id. See also Michael J. Treblicock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, ch 1
(Roudedge 2d ed 1999); Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade
(Princeton 1996); John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters (Columbia 1993).
30 When he wedded balance of powers to the idea of "containment," George Kennan authored the
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international scene.3 Increasingly, post-modern states accept, to various degrees,
control-sharing over domestic matters with supranational or global regimes and
institutions.32 Furthermore, states are experiencing a loss of domestic control
because, as we will describe in more detail below, traditional tools for regulating
social and economic life have been rendered less effective by increasingly
scattered cross-border forces and the rise of environmental, health and security
threats that are too diffuse to be controlled by domestic policy alone.33 The
nation is declining as the basis for the State. Instead of a world subdivided into
31 See Cooper, The Breaking of Nations at 65-69 (cited in note 8) (explaining that chaos and crime in
the modern world are increasingly less localized and cannot be controlled through actions of
individual states). Our argument on the changing nature of the relationship between states and
"welfare" is in no way intended to imply that states are abandoning (or ought to abandon) policies
intended to achieve the well-being of their people. Rather, we endorse the nuanced view that
Statecraft, and the basis for legitimacy of the State in the post-modern era, are shifting and that,
with that shift, comes a transformation of the fundamental goals and methods of the State in
relation to its subjects' well-being. As Professor Bobbitt stated:
[the] nation-state undertook to be responsible for economic planning for the
society, income redistribution, and democratic accountability, and it promised
to underwrite (in varying degrees) employment, heath care, education and old-
age security. The nation-state is rightly thought of as a new constitutional
order, for not only are these responsibilities a significant departure from those
of the state-nation, they also reflect the unique source of the nation-state's
legitimacy, its promise to provide for the material well being of the nation.
Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles at 240 (cited in note 3). The shift in Statecraft that Bobbitt identifies
challenges these fundamentals of the nation-state and leads the State towards its next incarnation,
where the enablement of opportunity (itself intended in a broad sense to further the people's
welfare) will be substituted for guarantees of a safety net with respect to the traditional
components of the welfare package in the modern world that Bobbitt describes. We note that
even popular journalists such as Thomas Friedman have noted this shift in the social contract
among the governed and the State. Thus, in his most recent book, Friedman writes: "The social
contract that progressives should try to enforce between government and workers, and companies
and workers, is one in which government and companies say, 'We cannot guarantee you any
lifetime employment. But we can guarantee you that government and companies will focus on
giving you the tools to make you more lifetime employable."' In a flat world, "the individual
worker is going to become more and more responsible for managing his or her own career, risks,
and economic security, and the job of government and business is to help workers build the
necessary muscles to do that." Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A BtiefHisto7 ofthe Twenty-
First Century 284 (Farrar Straus 2005). In our view, Friedman makes both a normative argument as
to what government "should do" and a descriptive argument as to what the government can or
cannot do, which echo the themes sounded in Bobbitt's Shield ofAchilles, and these ideas are
neither the exclusive province of a deregulating Right or a people-oriented Left. Rather, they
provide an insight into the transformative movements that have affected modern states, and the
adjustment to the fundamentals of Statecraft that should obtain as a result of the metamorphosis,
upon which we build our theoretical discussions of this Article.
32 Cooper, The Breaking ofNations at 27 (cited in note 8) ("The legitimate monopoly on force that is
the essence of statehood is thus subject to international-but self-imposed--constraints.").
33 Id at 102-13. "The essence of globalization is that it erodes the distinction between domestic and
foreign events." Id at 110-11.
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discrete nation-states and national economies, the international landscape has
become diffuse and the main interlocutors of the State and the order of states
have become cross-border actors.
Welfare has also begun to fade as the legitimating basis for the State.34 The
decline of welfare is taking two discrete forms: the strong strain in Continental
Europe on the cradle-to-grave systems established in the twentieth century35
and, perhaps more significantly, the failure of the welfare state to take root in the
South. With regard to welfare, Europe is witnessing a dual internal phenomenon.
In part, the welfare system is viewed as an inalienable set of social rights, a core
component of the acquis social set of progressive measures that should never be
reversed. Britain, for example, is increasing its public spending on welfare.36 In
France, any governmental attempt to decrease the level of benefits in a
meaningful way is sure to be met with unrest and protest of the kind that
paralyzed the country at various times in recent years. At the same time, the
State by all accounts is rapidly losing its ability to sustain welfare programs. The
aging of the European population endangers retirement schemes.37 The
economic burdens placed on employers hinder employment, social mobility, and
fluid growth, and such burdens consistently fall short of generating the income
necessary to shore up the system, which is constantly running at a deficit.
The difficulty of achieving welfare will arguably lead governments to shift
their focus towards the maximization of economic opportunity. Such policies
could take many forms. In Japan, for example, the government may focus on
subsidizing research and development to give domestic industries the best
possible edge.38 Elsewhere, the emphasis may be on providing education and
infrastructure while deregulating markets.39 Other societies may emphasize
commercial structures that give workers ownership stakes, so as to maximize
34 See Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles at 240-42 (cited in note 3).
35 The situation is particularly acute in Germany. See Mark Landler, German Joblessness Rises As Benefits
Are Reduced, NY Times C5 (Feb 3, 2005). The complexities of the German context are discussed
in Peter Bleses and Martin Seeleib-Kaier, The Dual Transformation of the German Welfare State
(Palgrave Macmillan 2004). See also Gabor Steingart, Deutschland: DerAbsieg eines Superstars (2004)
(the story of Germany's rise and decline since 1945).
36 2004 HM Spending Review, PN A2 (July 12, 2004), available online at <http://www.hm-treasury
.gov.uk/spending-review/spend-sr04/press/spend-srO4_pressl3.cfm> (visited Sept 19, 2005).
See also Rachel Smithies, Public and Private Wefare Activioy in the United Kingdom, 1979 to 1999,
available online at <http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper93.pdf> (visited Sept 19,
2005).
37 For data on European population issues, see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
Population Activities Unit, available online at <http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/pau/pau-h
.htm> (visited Nov 1, 2005).
38 Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles at 284 (cited in note 3).
39 Id at 670-71.
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their opportunity for economic advancement. ° In all events, instead of focusing
on guaranteeing the welfare of everyone, the State will gradually shift its
foundational approach towards maximizing the economic opportunity available
to all.4 While welfare policies of course continue to obtain in Europe and
throughout the world, the tide of history seems to be shifting away from welfare
as the core element of Statecraft that was axiomatic in the modern world.
In sum, the developments described above have resulted in a trend towards
the modern state's loss of its ability to control the domestic arena and to enact
policies that would protect the welfare of the nation.42 To be sure, the world is
not completely post-modern; as Cooper notes,4 3 post-modern states live
alongside modern and even pre-modern states. 44 In addition, there are various
pre-modern states in the international scene where the official organs of the
State do not even enjoy exclusive use of force within their own borders.
Nevertheless, we believe that the trend we are describing provides an accurate
account of a transformational move in Statecraft and international relations.
II. JACOB'S LADDER: A THEORY OF INTERWOVEN MECHANICS
The foundational notions of the international trading system do not reflect
the outcome of a material dialectic among states (such as the historical
recognition of the damage that arose from the failure to follow a comparative
advantage model), but arise from the interwoven architecture of the State, the
international trade order of states, and the parallel yet connected evolution of
both. Transformations in domestic Statecraft drive the evolution of the
international trade order and, in turn, transformative shifts on the international
commercial plane tend to change the domestic configuration of the State.
This relationship of interdependence and connectedness is dynamic and
manifests itself on a foundational level. The domestic constitutional architecture
40 Id at 673.
41 Id at 672-76.
42 For an insightful analysis of the complex relation between states and transnational firms and
control of the domestic arena, see Saskia Sassen, The State and GlobaiZaion, in Rodney B. Hall and
Thomas J. Biersteker, eds, The Emergence of Private Authoriy in Global Governance 91-110 (Cambridge
2002).
43 See Cooper, The Breaking of Nations at 16-26 (cited in note 8).
44 Certain important players in the international scene, such as Indonesia and India, may still qualify
as modern states. These states, while operating in an increasingly post-modern world, continue to
adhere to notions of sovereignty and nation, and they are not characterized by the same degree of
diffuseness that is increasingly apparent in post-modem states. But see, for example, Gurcharan
Das, Is India Shining? Wall St J A20 (May 3, 2004) (discussing India's drive to achieve "nation-
building" through economic success).
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of the State,45 such as its choice of a particular route to the nation's welfare
through policies of indicative planning or cradle-to-grave social protection,46 has
profound repercussions on the ordering of the international trade system.47 At
the same time, shifts in the foundational rules of the international trade system
and in patterns of international economic activity, such as the rise of a new set
of international economic actors and transformations in currency markets, affect
the ability of the State to maintain its domestic Statecraft and tend to transform
the internal order of the State.48 Like Jacob's Ladder, the State and the order of
states are animated by a constant interaction going from bottom to top, and vice
versa, in a dynamic motion that shapes both spheres and, in turn, propels them
forward through various stages of history. Just as Fukuyama and Hegel were
lured into thinking that strategic and political history had ended, trade theorists
might misinterpret a historical transformation of sufficient significance as
sounding the end of trade history. Comparative advantage, for example, might
acquire a semi-mythical status as a timeless value bound to animate the trade
system on a foundational level. In truth, however, the story always continues:
45 See Part I above for an explanation of the meaning of constitutional architecture as used in this
context.
46 We use the concept of welfare to capture the policies of a nation-state that foster a broad level of
acceptance of modern liberal democracy by the different constituent elements of the nation-state.
Western Europe, Asia and the United States were the most powerful players in the international
order. In addition to its security and strategic functions, the State as experienced by all these
players' redistributed wealth, provided a safety net for the nation, and protected economic and
other rights for broad segments of the population. The policy choices and the law that sprung
from this fundamental element of Statecraft spanned a substantial part of the inner order of the
states (including labor laws, unemployment benefits, retirement rules, aid to families, taxation law,
subsidies, public investment and other central components of the domestic legal and regulatory
order). As discussed in the text accompanying notes 38-41, nation-states such as France, the
United States, and Japan took different approaches to achieving welfare, but their inner orders
shared the same essential hallmarks of legitimacy of the nation-state in relation to the nation.
47 As the twentieth century progressed, the association between the ethos of the nation-state and
welfare policies deepened. See Michael Hart, Coerion or Cooperation: Social Poligy and Future Trade
Negotiations, 20 Can-US L J 351, 377 (1994). Over the course of the twentieth century, the
attributes of the nation-state grew further to embrace the social welfare state. By the middle of
the century, attributes of the nation-state included not only territorial and national integrity, but
also the capacity to promote the economic and social well-being of its citizens. At the same time,
the post-war system of multilateral rules and organizations became the latest expression of rules
to govern inter-state relations. As with the expansion in the attributes of the nation-state, the
range of issues addressed by the rules of inter-state relations had similarly expanded. Id.
48 Id. Today we face a new reality. Advances in transportation and communications technology have
made it possible to breach the territorial, social, and cultural integrity of the nation-state on a daily
basis. The convergence of popular cultures and the crisis of the welfare state all point to the need
to develop a new definition of sovereignty as well as a new set of norms and rules for inter-state
relations. In short, we need a new set of rules that recognizes that the realm of goods, services,
capital, and technology has largely escaped from the effective regulation of the territorial nation-
state, while its people remain largely attached to it. Id.
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comparative advantage was clearly an appropriate foundational norm for a trade
system dominated by modern liberal democracies organized in Statecraft form
but, as explained below, it no longer provides a complete account of the trade
story.
As detailed below, the dynamic relationship of interdependence and
connectedness between the State and the order of states may be observed at a
descriptive level. In addition, as a normative matter, states must acknowledge
overarching structural changes within their domestic sphere as well as on the
international plane, and quickly identify how these shifts affect their interaction
with the rest of the international economic community. Trade policy must then
be adjusted to accord with internal political and ideological goals and with the
evolving international scene. To be sure, structural shifts do not happen
overnight, however, there comes a point when a constitutional moment is
needed. At that moment, states must come together and recognize that
Statecraft and the order of states have undergone a metamorphosis of sufficient
magnitude to warrant a new set of constitutional rules.49
The constitutional moment is a rite of passage, in that it marks an
international awareness that change has occurred. It is an important exercise in
recognizing the nature of the change and in instilling throughout the system
fundamental new norms that will develop throughout the new era. The states'
failure to recognize the constitutional moment will not only prejudice them
economically, but also possibly hamper the achievement of their non-trade
strategic foreign policy objectives. Ending history, then, is not only an academic
and intellectual mistake; it is as dangerous an illusion as believing that World
War II invaders could be repelled with a Maginot Line born out of World War I.
The human difficulty in stepping out of deeply rooted paradigms to look at the
future is bound to generate defeat in the present.
We have selected the twentieth century as a historical prism from which to
illustrate our theory, focusing on the GATT/WTO system. The twentieth
century trade story, as classically told, is one of failure and redemption. In this
instance, beginning the inquiry with an exploration of redemption, and telling
the story with the voice of an economist, makes the contours of failure clearer.
49 We argue in Part III that such a constitutional moment has become necessary in the early part of
the twenty-first century. As illustrated in various contexts below, we use the notion of
constitutional moment as a conscious choice based on the interaction of Statecraft as inner law. It
relates less to a change in the ordering of society that legitimizes the adoption of certain
constitutional norms, than it does to the infusion of new norms to recognizing the interaction
between inner state order and the international order of states. But see Bruce Ackerman, A
Generation of Betrayal?, 65 Fordham L Rev 1519 (1997) (defining a constitutional moment as a
moment that "occurs when a rising political movement succeeds in placing a new problematic at
the center of American political life").
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Redemption happens after World War II, with the incorporation into the GATT
of the theories of absolute and comparative advantage developed by Adam
Smith and David Ricardo."° Both economists posited that states would maximize
their wealth by unilaterally eliminating import restrictions." However, they did
not address the use of law to erect an international system that would
institutionalize their economic insights.5 2 The GATT did that. 3 At its core, the
GATT established three "disciplines" that removed states' ability to discriminate
against one another in an effort to protect the domestic economy: (i) tariff
bindings; (ii) a non-discrimination norm applicable to internal taxation and
regulation; and (iii) a prohibition of quotas and like measures."
The first trade liberalizing discipline created a framework for GATT
Contracting Parties to bind the tariffs that they imposed on foreign products, the
primary protectionist barrier of the first half of the twentieth century.5" In turn,
each state committed, under the Most Favored Nation Clause of the GATT, to
extend to all trading partners the lowest tariff concession chosen by the state
with respect to any partner. This structure generated eight rounds of trade
negotiations, and a drastic reduction of the global tariff barriers to trade that
prevailed before Bretton Woods.5 6
50 See Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, GATT-Think, Nati Bureau of Economic Research,
Discussion Paper No 8005 (Nov 2000), available online at <http://www.nber.org/papers/
w8005> (visited Sept 20, 2005).
51 See, for example, Willem Molle, The Economics of European Integration: Theoy, Pracice, Poliy
(Dartmouth 2d ed 1994).
52 Robert Howse, From Politics to Tecnocrag-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime,
96 Am J Intl L 94 (2002).
53 The post-World War II project commonly referenced as the "Bretton Woods system" included
three distinct parts: (i) the ordering of international trade through an International Trade
Organization; (ii) the fostering of international development under the umbrella of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and (iii) the administration of monetary
and financial matters through the International Monetary Fund. The International Trade
Organization did not pass Congressional muster, and the larger enterprise was reduced to the
GATT, a core component aimed, in substantial part, at removing barriers to trade and adopting
exceptions to the trade liberalization rules. See, for example, Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade
and Social Regulation: Moing Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 Chi J Intl L 625 (2005).
54 This removal of barriers to trade spumed a sharp increase in cross-border economic activities
among nation-states over the second half of the twentieth century. The GATT took off with 23
Contracting Parties, and gradually took hold in over 150 nations. It progressively expanded to
new subject matter areas, such as intellectual property and trade in services. These developments
are, in retrospect, what grant Bretton Woods its status as a constitutional moment.
55 GATr, art XXVIII bis (cited in note 19).
s6 The GAIT sought to "tariffy" barriers to trade so as to establish a transparent framework for
tariff reduction negotiations in successive "rounds." Over the course of the eight rounds that
were completed since the GAIT came into effect among its original twenty-three signatories, the
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The second discipline required the Contracting Parties to respect a non-
discrimination norm that guarantees all imported products the same treatment as
"like" domestic products with respect to internal taxation and regulation. 7 At its
core, the "national treatment" discipline prevents the circumvention of a tariff
binding through imposition of a discriminatory burden in the form of, for
example, an internal sales tax.58 The concept of discrimination is of course laden
with ambiguity and has generated substantial controversy. Controversy arises
because the discrimination principle allows international challenges to national
policies ostensibly unrelated to trade, but that nevertheless disparately impact
foreign products on account of disparities in the regulatory levels of protection
in various states-one of the facets of the "linkage" issue. 59 However, putting
aside interpretive difficulties, the national treatment component of the GATT is
an indispensable element of any treaty of integration that includes a tariff
reduction scheme. Without a national treatment discipline, a member state of
such a treaty could impose discriminatory taxation or regulation on foreign
products so as to avoid its tariff obligations.6"
average tariff among Contracting Parties has gone down from above 40 percent to less than 4
percent. See generally <http://www.wto.org> (visited Oct 6, 2005).
57 GAT, art III (cited in note 19).
58 See, for example, Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic
Beverages, Nov 10, 1987, GATT BISD (34th Supp) 83, available online at <http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop.e/dispu..e/gt47ds.e.htm> (visited Nov 8, 2005).
59 See, for example, World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, WTO Doc No WT DS-8-R (July 11, 1996). In this case, the WTO rejected the US
argument to the effect that an aim and effect test should be applied to root out protectionism
when determining whether the national treatment provisions of the GATfT were violated. The
literature and commentary on national treatment are voluminous and lie beyond the scope of this
Article. Even with an explicit mandate to root out protectionism and to shelter national laws that
furthers legitimate government purposes, national laws that involve both protectionist and
legitimate purposes might be challenged. In Reformulated Gasoline, for example, the WTO was
asked to evaluate the legality of a US regulation, promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act,
which imposed more onerous requirements on foreign companies, ostensibly on the grounds that
compliance with the substantive norm of the statute was difficult. While a protectionist purpose
might be inferred from the record, it is also evident that the United States' interest in protecting
its environment was at stake. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body,
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/AB/R
(Apr 29, 1996).
60 To illustrate this point, imagine that State A agrees not to impose a tariff on State B's cars in
excess of 5 percent. If State A enacted a discriminatory sales tax, which burdens State B's cars by,
say, 10 percent, it would have achieved a functionally equivalent economic result as a 10 percent
tariff would accomplish. The difficult questions of interpretation arise when, for example, the
internal sales tax applies to cars that consume more than a specified level of gasoline per mile, and
State A's sales tax disproportionately burden State B's cars because they tend to belong the
category of products that is affected by the (ostensibly neutral) definition.
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The third discipline prohibits the imposition of quantitative restrictions to
trade and their functional equivalents.6' The purpose of this discipline, and the
interpretive questions that it has generated, parallel the national treatment story.
Here, too, the founders of the GATT evidently sought to deprive states of a
weapon for circumvention of the tariff discipline.62 The GATT, then, gave
multilateral, institutional expression to the classical economic theories of Ricardo
and Smith. The orthodox economic account of the GATT speaks of
redemption, because it contrasts the GATT with the economic failures that
preceded World War II. The crux of the account is that, before World War II,
the major trading partners failed to recognize that commerce should be based on
comparative advantage and that states should remove artificial barriers to trade
(principally tariffs). Worse still, not only did the Treaty of Versailles oppress
Germany instead of bringing it into Europe's fold as a partner, but the liberal
democracies stubbornly insisted on what economic theories would describe as a
timeless notion of economic organization. 63 Bretton Woods is the constitutional
moment of this story in that it reflects the understanding of the historical
mistakes made by the liberal democracies. The Book of Mistakes had to be
rewritten into the Book of Redemption. Economic collapse caused by trade wars
would not only be unthinkable, but made impossible by a trading system that
adopted comparative advantage as its fundamental value.64
All serious students of trade, however, have learned that the economic
ideology of trade provides only a partial, and perhaps even misleading, account
of the original intent of the framers of the GATT and the reasons for its general
acceptance by the Contracting Parties. In order to understand the GATT, one
must understand the internal foundational frameworks and constitutional rules
61 GATT, art XI (cited in note 19).
62 See, for example, Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, May 15, 1984 GATT BISD (31 st Supp) 94,
available online at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/gt47ds-e.htm> (visited Sept
19, 2005).
63 See, for example, Paul R. Krugman, A Loss of (Theoretical) Nerve: The Narrow and BroadArguments for
Free Trade, 83 Am Econ Rev 62 (May Pt 2 362 1993). See also, Molle, The Economics of European
Integration at 40 (cited in note 51); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Generalized Theogy of Distortions and
Welfare, in Jagdish N. Bhagwati, et al, eds, Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth: Papers in International
Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger69 (North-Holland 1971); Jagdish N. Bhagwati and V.K.
Ramaswarni, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71 J Pol Econ 44 (1963);
Harry G. Johnson, Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions 9, in Robert E.
Baldwin, et al, Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments: Essays in Honor of Gottfi'ed Haberler 3 (Rand
McNally 1965).
64 See Bretton Woods Project, Background to the Issues, available online at <http://www.
brettonwoodsproject.org/background/index.shtml> (visited Nov 8, 2005) (stating that the forty-
three countries that met at Bretton Woods created the World Bank and IMF in order to help
rebuild Europe after World War I1).
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of the major players who brought about its formation.65 These constitutional
rules help explain why the major economic powers that formed the GATT
chose the legal structure that it embodied, and mustered the political willingness
to accept the trade disciplines imposed under the GATT.
Our account complements the purely economic story. We essentially hold
that the internal configuration of the states that formed the GATT needed to
work in harmony with any international system put in place. States did not
simply have an economic epiphany. They chose the framework underlying the
GATT because it allowed them to maintain their domestic architecture as they
entered into an international framework that expanded the global economic pie.
The main players' commitment to an interventionist welfare state ensured that
the economic project would be married to a political redistributive enterprise.66
While this account goes deeper than the economic tale, it still speaks of the
end of history. It starts with constitutional rules, which were fundamental to
modern liberal democracies after World War II. These rules included the broad
legal and policy schemes that embodied a given nation-state's wealth choices
with respect to redistributive justice and the relationship between various
economic segments of society. In Europe, these schemes took the shape of
public enterprise, unemployment compensation, housing aid, assistance to large
families, and other policies intended to transfer wealth from high-income
segments of society to lower income workers and thus protect discrete classes
deemed to be disadvantaged in the market. In the United States, the emphasis
was more exclusively on tax and transfer policies. Japan, for its part, relied
heavily on centralized planning of industrial activity and subsidies of research
and development that would shore up enterprises housing a large part of the
domestic workforce.67 Despite their different viewpoints, all major players
shared a basic philosophy of domestic Statecraft that went hand-in-hand with
liberalized trade.68 The Bretton Woods system married international economic
policies (and an international order of states that tended to maximize wealth
65 See Howse, 96 Am J Intl L at 95 (cited in note 52).
66 See id at 97 (describing the move towards the system that John Ruggie aptly labeled as
"embedded liberalism").
67 See Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade 7 (Roudedge
2001); Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade 5 (Princeton 1996)
(explaining that a free trade policy does not necessarily conform to free trade doctrine); John G.
Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters (Columbia 1993).
68 See Howse, 96 Am J Intl L at 95 (cited in note 52); John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World
Polit: Essays on International Institutionalization 72-73 (Roudedge 1998). But see Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EurJ Intl L 733 (1999).
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creation) with a legal framework that protected the nation-states' ability to
control their domestic economies.69
The harmonious functioning of domestic constitutional rules and
international law went hand-in-hand with historical tendencies that made
comparative advantage a better foundational norm for the international trading
system than the domestically-driven mercantilist policies that preceded World
War II. The founders of the GATT believed that mercantilism, as embodied in
statutes like the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930, ° had contributed to the
economic disaster of the 1930s and to the advent of fascism as a contender for a
model of Statecraft." They thus bound the liberal democracies to a set of rules
that would not only make such disasters legally impossible but would in no way
threaten their perception of economic sovereignty; the GATT created a world
trade system that accorded with their internal laws and politics.
7 2
Our theory posits that the relationship between the domestic constitutional
realm and the international trade order of states goes beyond the marriage of a
good economic idea with a legal system that makes it politically feasible. We
depart from the notion that Bretton Woods joined comparative advantage with a
theory of modern liberal democracy as the highest expression of the State, thus
achieving the ultimate trade order of states. Rather, we submit that Bretton
Woods ushered in a crucial yet particular constitutional moment that
acknowledged both the then-current evolutionary stage of the State and the new
order of states generated by the metamorphosis in Statecraft. From its inception,
then, the Bretton Woods system set in motion the seeds of a transformative
69 See Howse, 96 Am J Inl L at 95 (cited in note 52); Ruggie, Construcling the World Poli i at 72-73
(cited in note 68).
70 See The Columbia Encyclopedia, Hawly-Smoot TariffAct (Bartleby.com 6th ed 2005), available online
at <http://www.bartleby.com/65/ha/HawleySm.html> (visited Apr 5, 2005) ("The act brought
retaliatory tariff acts from foreign countries, US foreign trade suffered a sharp decline, and the
depression intensified."). See generally Irwin, Against the Tide at 26-44, 193-99 (cited in note 29).
71 See Howse, 96 Am J Ind L at 95 (cited in note 52).
72 As Professor Weiler has pointed out, the GATT's economic ethos largely resulted from the
creation of a professional trade elite. This elite created a set of norms intended to project the
impression that the GATT was grounded in "economic science" and insulated from crass politics:
A dominant feature of GATT was its self-referential and even communitarian
ethos explicable in constructivist terms. GATT successfully managed relative
insulation from the "outside" world of international relations, and it
established among its practitioners a closely knit environment revolving
around shared normative values (of free trade) and shared institutional
ambitions. GATT operatives became a classical "network" of first-name
contacts and friendly relationships.
J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lanyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on WTO Dispute Settlement, in
Roger B. Porter, et al, eds, Effcieny, Equiy, and Legitimay: The Mullilateral Trading System at the
Millenium 336-37 (Brookings 2001).
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phenomenon that would ultimately necessitate another constitutional moment
for the trade order of states.
Our starting point coincides with the analysis of Bretton Woods as a joint
political and economic enterprise in that we agree that the Keynesian welfare
state was particularly well-suited for the GATT framework and its introduction
of comparative advantage and anti-protectionist rules. Keynes was right to call
the lawyers, and the political theory that they wrote into the GATT, the "poets
of Bretton Woods." 3 The GATT, as explained above, sheltered welfare policies
and left its constituent states free to act as experimental laboratories for
improvement of their peoples' welfare. 4 All in all, it is true that the GATT
established a framework that insulated domestic politics and redistribution
choices from international intervention, and to that extent accorded with the
ethos of the welfare state.
However, in our account, Bretton Woods came (and, as discussed below, it
came too late) to crystallize in a constitutional moment transformations that had
previously taken place and to take one more constitutional snapshot in the story
of human organizational evolution in relation to trade and the State. Recognizing
Bretton Woods as such mandates inquiry into what the next constitutional stage
should be, and when the rite of passage that will set it in motion should be held.
That inquiry is our task in Part III. For the moment, let us explain the Bretton
Woods that was (and the Bretton Woods that should have come earlier).
As discussed in Part I, the State may be understood as an enduring entity
that undergoes successive constitutional cycles. During each cycle, the State
exhibits relatively stable, yet slowly shifting, constitutional features on both the
domestic and international planes. At the same time, often as a result of the
operation of these constitutional features, new realities arise that force states to
adjust their fundamental constitutional elements, and gradually usher in yet
another cycle. Though theorists like Hegel or Fukuyama predict "the end of
history" at these moments, they are not in fact signaling the beginning of a
Kantian era of "perpetual peace, 7' nor an end to the evolution of Statecraft.
Rather, those voices keenly reflect a sentiment of transformation, widely felt,
that should prompt an inquiry into whether a new constitutional cycle may be at
hand.
73 Howse, 96 Am J Intl L at 96 (cited in note 52).
74 Consider GATT, art VI (cited in note 19) (generally allowing anti-dumping practices even though
they tend to be harmful to free trade); World Trade Organization, Agreement on Safeguards,
WTO Doc No LT/UR/A-1A/8 (Apr 15, 1994).
75 Immanuel Kant, Pepetual Peace (Liberal Arts 1948). See also Kagan, Paradise and Power at 3 (cited in
note 8). Consider Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International
OganiZation 250-51 (Random House 1961).
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The State that Bretton Woods faced arose from a period of solidification
of the "nation" as its basis. At least in Europe, twentieth century states were
founded upon nations that had come together under a State for the purpose of
amassing resources and fighting wars that would further their goals of
solidification.76 On the international scene, these states maintained complex
colonizing enterprises with strong commercial motivations that by all accounts
generated substantial economic benefits for the colonizers.77 This influenced the
political and economic power of those nation-states that dominated the
international scene. At the same time, the domestic process of building a nation
generated a population comprised of various segments collectively affiliated with
a single state; these segments included a large working class, a bourgeoisie, and
upper classes or nobility." The State was then forced to contend with the newly-
formed nation.
The focal point of our inquiry is not the organizational nature of the State
as a modern liberal democracy, but rather the solidification process that it
experienced, the attendant birth of a nation as its support, and the evolution in
Statecraft that arose out of these phenomena. It is against this background that
the competing theories of Marxism, fascism, and modern liberal democracy
compete with one another for control of the State. Under each scenario
envisaged by the models, whether a triumph of the workers, an eternal Reich, or
Fukuyama's "end of history," Statecraft history runs its course and ends in a
particular form of organization in relation to the nation.79 In each case, the
nation is the basis of the State, and the welfare of that nation is the state's
legitimating raison d'tre. Hence, a shared objective is achieved by different routes.
Without this evolution of Statecraft, the competing ideologies would not require
the conquest of additional territory.80
76 Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles at 144-45 (cited in note 3).
77 See generally Ruth E. Gordon and Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 Wis Intl L J 1, 11
(2004).
78 See generally Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Oigin and Spread of
Nationalism (Verso 1991).
79 See generally Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding 89, 97-100 (Princeton
1994) (titling its chapter on the meaning of "nation" and related terms as "Terminological
Chaos"); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism 58-69 (Princeton 1993); E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and
Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 1-13 (Cambridge 1990); Hugh Seton-Watson,
Nations and States: An Enquig into the Origins of Naions and the Politics of Nationalism 3 (Westview
1977); Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and ColonialQuestion 8 (International 1934). This is
true even though, under Marxist theory, the nation-state would ultimately wither away in favor of
rule by international workers.
80 But see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cornell 1983); Anthony D. Smith, Theories of
Nationa'sm 8, 65 (Duckworth 1971).
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The significance of the nature of Statecraft for Bretton Woods lies in the
natural harmony between comparative advantage and a nation-state's Statecraft.
We agree with scholars such as Ruggie that from a political standpoint, Bretton
Woods worked well for modern liberal democracies. 8' We agree with Keynes
that, without the delicate poetry of Bretton Woods, the modern liberal
democracies might not have accepted the GATT as they did.82 We accept the
economists' account of comparative advantage as a better norm for the
twentieth century trading world than mercantilism. 83 However, our story focuses
on Statecraft as an integrated set of ideas and concepts and as the concrete
manifestation of those ideas in the domestic and international realms and in the
ladder that links them. We submit that by 1917, the modern liberal democracies
had sufficient evidence of the need for a trade constitutional moment in the
realm of pure ideas and their manifestation in the economic reality of the states.
Thus, Bretton Woods could have occurred then as the next stage in the
evolution of Statecraft and ordering of states.
By 1917, the nation-state, and the internal economic order it generated, had
resulted in an industrialized world subdivided into discrete national economies.
The nation owned virtually all means of production within the territory
governed by its state, the welfare of that nation provided the State with its
legitimating drive, and states had the means and the incentive to regulate and
control the domestic realm.84 The very elements that changed the nature of
Statecraft, from a State supported by the nation to a State harnessing itself to the
nation, were reflected in the domestic reality. The core assets of each state lay in
the hands of the nation-one of the key assumptions of Bretton Woods that is
gradually waning today.85 Industrial, agricultural, and other types of output could
consistently be identified with the nation. The trading world could be subdivided
into blocs, each of which was comprised of an aggregate of goods, capital,
assets, currency, and other resources that in a real sense belonged to the nation.
Nevertheless, the State had a sufficient degree of control over this "national"
81 See Ruggie, Construcing the World Polity at 76 (cited in note 68).
82 See Howse, 96 Am J Intl L at 96, 116 (cited in note 52).
83 See, for example, Krugman, 83 Am Econ Rev at 362 (cited in note 63). See also Molle, Economics
of European Integration at 47 (cited in note 51).
84 See Hart, 20 Can-US LJ at 357, 364 (cited note 47).
85 Id at 377. Today we face a new reality. Advances in transportation and communications
technology have made it possible to breach the territorial, social, and cultural integrity of the
nation-state on a daily basis. The convergence of popular cultures and the crisis of the welfare
state all point to the need to develop a new definition of sovereignty as well as a new set of norms
and rules for inter-state relations. In short, we need a new set of rules that recognizes that the
realm of goods, services, capital and technology has largely escaped from the effective regulation
of the territorial nation-state, while its people remain largely attached to it. Id.
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economy, and a concrete bloc of resources associated with its nation, to
implement welfare policies of the type contemplated by the economic and
political bargain of Bretton Woods and to legitimize itself vis-A-vis the nation.
Given the condition of Statecraft in 1917, the foundational norms of the trade
order of states had to change, thus signaling that the time had been ripe for a
constitutional moment by the time of Bretton Woods.
The last pieces of the Statecraft puzzle lie in the concept of balance of
powers and in the connection between strategy, war, and the trade order of
states. The modern world, as described by Robert Cooper, includes balance of
powers as an essential feature.86 A multi-polar world of solidified nation-states
rests on a balance of powers among its constituent entities. In the trade world,
this phenomenon is replicated, and here again the Bretton Woods moment may
be understood as recognizing that phenomenon, albeit too late. Bretton Woods
joined the theory of comparative advantage with substantial cross-Atlantic
investment into sovereign, democratic blocs in Western Europe (and Japan) as
part of the Marshall Plan. The new trade system respected borders and
sovereignty, and it allowed states to advance national welfare through internal
policies. The Marshall Plan's infusion of capital into Europe created trading
partners whose economic strengths would enable them to maintain the requisite
balance of powers.87 In turn, the GATT as an institution followed the one-state,
one-vote model of the United Nations (the very phrase connoting the
prevalence of the nation-state as the model of Statecraft), and organized itself
around succeeding rounds of negotiation that gradually reduced barriers to (and
otherwise liberalized) trade.
III. TRADE AND THE NEEDS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
We submit that the GATT theoretical framework was a unique expression
of Statecraft in the evolution of the nation-state. The State harnessed itself to the
nation following an era during which it mustered the strength of the nation to
solidify itself. Its legitimating raison d'gtre was the guarantee of the nation's
welfare, which expressed itself through wealth redistribution and other
interventionist policies that varied from state to state." Comparative advantage,
as expressed through a trade-liberalizing order of states, complemented domestic
control over these policies.89 Put otherwise, Bretton Woods established a
86 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations at 23-26 (cited in note 8).
87 See Robert Lowe Hall, International Economic Co-operation After 1945, 33 Hist Today 13 (Dec 1983).
88 Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles at 208 (cited in note 3).
89 As explained above, this allowed the constituent states to follow various policies intended to
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modern order of states consistent with the solidified State at the core of modern
Statecraft. Our claim is that the international trade order generated by Bretton
Woods was (ironically) bound to erode the nation-state, contribute to the arrival
of post-modern Statecraft, and necessitate an adjustment to a new international
order.9° The new order, we argue, calls for a set of norms and institutions that
will complement those that Bretton Woods introduced to spread the gospel of
comparative advantage. We identify the "enablement of global economic
opportunity" as the new foundational norm for the system, and diffuse, inter-
connected institutional frameworks, charged with implementing discrete projects
rather than comprehensively achieving a goal such as comparative advantage,
and operating outside of the one-state, one vote model of the modern world, as
the institutional setting to actuate such norm.
There are three corollaries to our argument: (i) History never ends because
the interdependent mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states will, in each
generation, usher in the need for revision of the international commercial order
and hence a new constitutional moment; (ii) Theoreticians and planners of trade
can predict not only the issues that a trade system will generate at any moment
in history, but also decipher and anticipate the contours of the next generation,
but only if they understand the mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states;
(iii) Each constitutional moment is bound to set in motion transformative
mechanisms that essentially plant the seeds of the succeeding generation. At
present, we are witnessing the passage to the post-modern generation of trade.
A. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BRETTON WOODS WORLD
Bretton Woods inherited and shaped a world subdivided into national
economies coextensive with the nation-states that established the trade order of
the GATT. Again, the theoretical foundation of the system respected
sovereignty, left it to internal domestic policy to control the redistribution of
wealth, and removed trade restrictions as protectionist tools from the panoply of
government interventionist policies.9 Looking at the Bretton Woods order right
after World War II through the lens of modern Statecraft, a theoretician of trade
could have articulated the principal legal and structural issues that would face the
system over the next decades. For instance, even though it was deflected by the
90 This claim is both descriptive, in that (as described in Part I) the passage to post-modem
Statecraft is gradually taking place in the field, and normative, in that (as described below) the
Bretton Woods world was bound to erode the modem nation-state and contribute to the advent
of post-modern Statecraft.
91 See generally Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staigler, GATT-Think, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No 8005 (Nov 2000) (cited in note 50).
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poets of Bretton Woods in the embedded liberalism bargain, 92 "linkage" 93 was
bound to become a core question facing the Bretton Woods generation because
of the central place of sovereignty and control over the nation's welfare in the
modern state.94 Further, as a matter of predictive history, a theoretician armed
with the Statecraft lens could have foreseen that the Bretton Woods order would
generate a transformed international economic landscape. In turn, as described
below, the metamorphosis of the trading world was bound to contribute to the
transformation of Statecraft and, in time, to generate the need for a revision of
the international trade order. We will first outline the metamorphoses that we
believe have brought us to the point of this new constitutional era. Then, in Part
IIJ.B, we will delineate the contours of the era and the foundational norms and
institutional framework that we believe should be put in place.
As a result of Bretton Woods, it was inevitable that the subdivision of the
world into economic units coextensive with nation-states would be eroded.95
The GATT and the WTO opened up borders to trade in goods and services;
this openness lies at the heart of comparative advantage. In such a marketplace,
92 Howse, 96 Am J Intl L at 96 (cited in note 52).
93 "Linkage" is a short term for the conflict between international trade-liberalizing norms and social
regulation in a world with varying forms of regulation. For an excellent summary of the current
debates and views of the linkage issue, including a salient analysis of why to link, what to link, and
whether to link, see Cho, 5 ChiJ Intl L at 630-43 (cited in note 53).
94 See Cooper, The Breaking of Naions at 22 (cited in note 8).
95 The transformation of the world will be outlined, in broad strokes, below. A wide variety of
commentators have sensed and described this change. Thomas Friedman, for example, speaks of
a "flat world," one in which national markets and production have become so integrated as to
create a flat playing field for an explosive array of commercial actors engaged in cross-border
transactions. Friedman, The World is Flat at 7-8 (cited in note 31). Jagdish Bhagwati, while
rejecting the "flat world" metaphor, advances a "kaleidoscopic comparative advantage" image that
focuses on increased competition from not only China and India (Friedman's core non-Western
actors), but also a diffuse team of states that have acquired expertise and comparative advantage.
Jagdish Bhagwati, A New Vocabulary for Trade, Wall St J A12 (Aug 4, 2005). Neither Friedman's
nor Bhagwati's views is universal. Other commentators, such as Robert Saul, insist that the very
image of globalization misleads the thinking public by overstating the magnitude of a capitalist
marketplace that is in fact dying. Instead, he believes that the nation-states born in the twentieth
century will reassert power and remain the main rulers of their internal marketplaces as the
twenty-first century progresses. John Ralston Saul, The Collapse of Globaksm (Overlook 2005). The
Saul-Friedman debate thus centers on the actors of trade. As these thinkers spar over the best
description of the trading world, Jeffrey Sachs points to the poorest states and argues that
globalized trade will do next to nothing for the one billion humans mired in abject poverty who
fall outside of the debate. Sachs argues that this global underclass do not need more trade or
market access but rather a direct grant of aid so as to build infrastructure, health, food security,
and other basic economic assumptions necessary to participate in the global marketplace. With a
modest effort from richer nations, Sachs claims (with some empirical support) that this could
occur-and end poverty. Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibiliies for Our Time 1-3,
20-25, 226-328 (Penguin 2005).
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goods and services are exchanged across borders by consumers, distributors, and
manufacturers. Manufacturers will purchase components necessary for their
output, and distributors will purchase products for domestic resale, from
jurisdictions that enjoy a comparative advantage. Importers will inevitably seek
to acquire equity or other stakes in their suppliers, so as to increase profit
margins. Conversely, exporters will seek to participate in the profits of the
importing companies. Joint ventures and other cross-border partnerships will
flourish. It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe exhaustively all
patterns of economic activity that resulted from the opening up of borders to
trade in goods and services, but the upshot is that the trading world that grew
out of the Bretton Woods system gradually "flattened" the economic units that
formed the core of that system (the nation-states).96
Interloping ownership and the spread of production units across nation-
state borders has contributed to the replacement of national products with
global, diffuse goods. Indeed, a handbag manufactured in China, designed in
Italy, bearing a French brand, and marked as "Made in Italy" is not a product of
any particular country, whatever the rules of origin might have to say about its
classification for tariff purposes. For example, DaimlerChrysler manufactures
cars that traditionally were viewed as quintessentially German (such as
Mercedes-Benz) and American (such as Jeep). However, after entering into a
strategic alliance with Mitsubishi Motors, it now also markets car brands
commonly associated with Asia.97 Its one billion shares are owned by investors
from all continents. This phenomenon obtains even on a small scale: New
York's garment district has shifted its production en masse from Brooklyn to the
Far East. These US garment manufacturers began the shift by shipping materials
for fabrication, and later they came to acquire factories or enter into strategic
alliances with their producers. Conversely, the Far East manufacturers are
increasingly acquiring stakes in their clients.98
96 See Charles W.L. Hill, International Business: Competing in the Global Markeiplace 366-67 (McGraw-
Hill Higher Education 4th ed 2003) (finding that the floating exchange rate regime that resulted
from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system encouraged companies to "dispers[e] production
to different locations around the globe as a real hedge against currency fluctuations").
97 DaimlerChrysler, DaimlerChsler, Hyundai, and Mitsubishi Motors to Form Global Engine Alliance, (May
5, 2002), available online at <http://www.daimlerchrysler.com/dccom/0,,0-5-7153-1-9426-1-0-0-
0-0-0-8-7145-0-0-0-0-0-0-1,00.html> (visited Sept 13, 2005). See also Courtship of Giants, Time
(Mar 19, 1990), available online at <http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,1098 7 ,96 9
608,00.html> (visited Sept 13, 2005).
98 See, for example, Lauren Weber, Our Global Closet: End of Trade Pact Likey Means More Americans
Will Be Dressed' by Chinese, Other Exporters - Pay Less, Newsday A50 (Jan 30, 2005); Elisabeth
Butler, Tattered Apparel Industry Faces More Wear, Tear. Firms Brace for End of Trade Quotas, Cran's
NY Bus 4 (Dec 13, 2004); Ada Lee Halofsky, As Even Pompoms Are Outsourced, A Fixture in the Field
Bears Up, NY Times 14.10 (Dec 5, 2004).
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The transformation of patterns of economic activity brought about by
Bretton Woods has been compounded by the revolution in global
communications. The steel mill, textiles plant, or agricultural field of the
twentieth century has been replaced by computer workstations that can be run
from virtually anywhere in the world. Microchips can now be manufactured in
Silicon Valley from computer software using codes written in India that, in the
aggregate, can be compared to a factory in terms of complexity.99 Transcription
services can be outsourced via access service provider software to the
Philippines. °° An American appellate brief can be researched and written in
Jamaica and filed by a licensed attorney in Camden, New Jersey.' Increased
trade and competition were bound to generate innovation, and the resulting
communications breakthroughs furthered the establishment of a global
marketplace where the phenomenon of discrete national economies has eroded.
Further, the explosion of economic activity in the transformed world has
also brought about a gradual shift in the fundamental policy tools of economic
regulation and wealth transfer from the domestic to the international realm.
Monetary policy, for example, is increasingly escaping control by states.
Although commentators disagree as to the extent of the loss of control by states
over monetary policy, the sheer magnitude of markets for currencies inevitably
results in the transformation of money from a tool of exchange, which can be
manipulated domestically, to a mere commodity.0 2 Public debt is increasingly
held by foreign actors, and it is increasingly affected more by the interplay of
commercial interests than by domestic policy choices. A simplified and simplistic
example is the relationship between the United States and Japan. The United
States has for a long time been a main purchaser of Japanese goods, and Japan a
main purchaser of US debt. While it is true that the United States has a
continuing ability to self-finance its debt, over time this phenomenon may
99 The New Geography of the IT Industry, Economist 53 (Jul 19, 2003) (discussing outsourcing of IT
technology to India). See also How Countries Go High-Tech, Economist 12 (Nov 10, 2001).
100 E-Services Phillippines, Phi/opines to Showcase IT Services Edge in Outsourdng Expo, available online at
<http://www.e-servicesphils.com/mediaroom.php?mrid=16> (visited Oct 6, 2005).
101 See, for example, <http://www.economicalservices.com> (visited Sept 6, 2005) (describing a
New Delhi-based company that offers legal research services throughout the world).
102 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles at 700-01 (cited in note 3). See also Michael Burawoy, The Great
Involution: Russia's Reiponse to the Market (Mar 28, 1999), available online at <http://sociology.
berkeley.edu/faculry/burawoy/burawoy-pdf/involudon.pdf> (visited Sept 13, 2005); Erin Ihde,
To Bank or Not to Bank: Edward Smith Hall on Free Trade and the Commodicalion of Money in Early New
South Wales, 83 J Aus Studies 13 (2004).
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extend to new actors on the international scene, including prominently China,
with a resulting decrease in domestic control.' °3
We posit that these phenomena, engendered by the Bretton Woods-driven
transformation of the international economic landscape, have resulted in the
erosion of modern Statecraft and contributed to the gradual shift towards post-
modern Statecraft that is described in Part I. A nation coextensive with national
boundaries and a national economy and output is slowly fading away as the
interlocutor of the State, and is being replaced by a diffuse array of economic
actors and activities that fall outside of their traditional control. States are losing
their grip over some economic tools used for regulation of economic and social
life. At the same time, as described in Part I, the states' ability to muster
domestic resources to sustain their welfare on a domestic level is being
challenged. The upshot is that the welfare of a nation, upheld by a State with
strong hallmarks of sovereignty, is fading away as an essential component of
Statecraft and a legitimating drive for states. This pillar of the Bretton Woods
world is bound to continue to gradually recess and become a more peripheral
component of Statecraft as the twenty-first century unfolds, to be replaced by a
post-modern Statecraft model in which the State becomes dedicated to (and
legitimates itself through) the enablement of economic opportunity.
Concurrently with these phenomena, the balance of powers that
characterized the modern world, which was centered on the modern liberal
democracies of Europe, the United States, and Japan, is eroding. As a result of
the global marketplace wrought by Bretton Woods, the twenty-first century has
inherited a multi-polar economic world resting on a global middle class spread
across the North and the South. Brazil, India, China, and South Korea, to cite a
few, have increasingly become world economic centers. Developing countries
have achieved growing importance on the world markets and gradually eroded
the dominant market share of the developed countries."m The old Second
World, made up of communist countries, is being replaced by a new Second
World comprised of economies formerly classified under the global heading of
"developing countries.'' 105 Lying within and alongside the first (post-modern)
103 For a general discussion, see Michael Burawoy, Transition Without Transformation: Russia's
Involutionagy Road to Capitalism 25-26, available online at <http://sociology.berkeley.edu/public_
sociology/public-sociology-pdf/Burawoy.pdf> (visited Nov 2, 2005) (discussing China, Russia,
and the commodification of money).
104 United Nations, Trade and Development Report 2005, ch IV, available online at
<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6086&intltemID=3453&lang=l&mod
e=toc> (visited Nov 17, 2005).
105 See Daniel R. Fung, Constitutional Reform in China: The Case of Hong Kong, 39 Tex Intl L J 467, 468
(2004):
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and second (modern) economies are pre-modern collectives of people that lack
the education, infrastructure, and other conditions to benefit from the
liberalization of trade that the WTO brought about. These collectives may be
Brazilian shantytowns, Afghan mountain towns, or the "excluded"
neighborhoods that surround Paris. The bottom line, though, is that the main
interlocutors of trade are no longer national middle classes represented by their
states; rather the trading world is comprised of a diffuse trading class, numbering
some eight hundred million people and spreading out in a multi-polar economic
configuration, that is surrounded by those who have yet to become meaningful
participants in the global marketplace.
The metamorphosis of the Bretton Woods world means that the trade
system's conceptual tool for understanding itself (an aggregation of nation-states
governed by the sovereignty, welfare, and balance of powers principles of the
twentieth century) is eroding. Our thesis holds that a new constitutional moment
is needed to usher in a new trade norm and trade institutions that will
complement Bretton Woods, comparative advantage, and accord with the post-
modern evolution of key actors of the trading world. In the next subpart, we
outline the contours of the new norm, which we describe as the "enablement of
global economic opportunity," of the post-modern institutions needed to
implement the norm, and of the (modest) constitutional moment that we
envision.
B. THE ENABLEMENT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
The "enablement of global economic opportunity" is a norm that accords
with Statecraft in a diffuse trading world no longer comprised of discrete
economic units coextensive with a nation whose welfare the State is dedicated to
promote. Our starting point, as with Bretton Woods, is grounded in domestic
Statecraft. As we argued in Part I, modern nation-states are gradually being
replaced by a collectivity of post-modern states that, although still living side-by-
side with modern and pre-modern collectives, will continue to spread post-
modern Statecraft during the twenty-first century. Whether they are in fact called
China is creating a whole new strata of sophisticated middle class urbanites
with a thirst for knowledge, an interest in all things foreign, money to spend
and a capacity to consume that is unprecedented in certainly China's history,
and, arguably, world history in terms of the life transformation of sheer
numbers of people.
See also Tim Latimer, A New Bourgeoisie Develops a Proletarian Taste, NY Times A4 (Nov 16, 1995)
(reporting on one effect of having a nascent middle class in Vietnam); Alejandro Portes, Jose
Itzigsohn, and Carlos Dore-Cabral, Urbanization in the Caribbean Basin: Social Change During the Years
of the Crisis, 29 Lat Am Res R 3, 21 (1994) (describing the rise of an urban middle class in the
Dominican Republic during the 1960s and 1970s).
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"cpost-modern," or go by labels such as "market-states," the important
substantive Statecraft element within those states is the gradual replacement of
the guarantee of the nation's welfare with the pushing and prodding of
economic activity as the legitimating drive of the State. Additionally, sovereignty
and balance of powers will gradually fade away because of the diffuseness that
characterizes the global marketplace and will be replaced by a horizontal playing
field created by the continued rise of a global trading class spread across
borders."°6 As we made clear in Part I, these phenomena do not mean that the
State will disappear. Rather, it will, slowly but surely, move on to its next cycle
and take on indicia of Statecraft different from those exhibited in the modern
era.
We submit that instead of managing welfare, the nation, sovereignty, and
balance of powers, post-modern states will increasingly need to manage
diffuseness on the international field and focus on the relationship between their
trading class and those of other modern and pre-modern collectivities. They will
then be able to foster economic opportunity for their own trading class. In turn,
just like Bretton Woods established a trade order that accorded with the
components of Statecraft of the modern states, a new constitutional era should
usher in a trade order that accords with these transformed elements of Statecraft
in the post-modern world. The trade order of states should establish norms, to
be superimposed on the Bretton Woods framework, that will embody the
enablement of global economic opportunity in a constitutional rite of passage.
We describe this constitutional rite of passage below. 07
Establishment of the enablement of global economic opportunity as an
animating norm of the trading system requires that we move beyond the WTO
and establish a new set of institutions. We believe that the trade institutions of
the future will lie outside the WTO, have a diffuse and shifting membership
consistent with the state of the increasingly post-modern trading world, and be
dedicated (at least initially) to implementing discrete projects and adopting ad
hoc regulation that in all likelihood will not apply to all states that belong to the
106 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations at 27-44 (cited in note 8). See also Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles at
233 (cited in note 3); Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Sodal Transformalion, Atlantic Monthly 72-73
(Nov 1994).
107 In many ways, economic opportunity is a logical extension of welfare promotion. The
solidification of the nation in the state-nation evolutionary stage brought about the nation-state.
The State's legitimating drive became the promotion of the welfare of the nation, in a world
where sovereign economic units coexisted within a balance-of-powers paradigm. That world
brought about the consolidation of economic units into a diffuse whole and resulted in weakening
the states. Given the erosion of welfare and of the nation, the State's legitimating drive should
logically move on to fostering economic opportunity and managing diffuseness. Unable to foster
welfare, deprived of the nation as the object of its welfare effort, the State can fall back on
economic opportunity as its next best alternative.
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WTO (double standards). Although our vision evokes the "World Economic
Organization" that some scholars have advocated," 8 we prescind from any
comprehensive global economic government charged with charting out a
universal course of action to achieve a stated goal (such as comparative
advantage) for everyone involved. Unlike the twentieth century modern society
of nations acting under a one-state, one-vote framework (which replicated the
internal order of modern liberal democracies), we advocate a post-modern
institutional framework that will work together with states and industry
representatives to manage the enablement of global economic opportunity
throughout the globe on a discrete, issue-driven basis.
This institutional structure should be consistent with the configuration of
the post-modern world. Thus, the structure should reflect the fact that the world
is no longer subdivided into economic units coextensive with the nation-state.
The solution lies in organizing trade governance along industry lines and
establishing flexible institutional frameworks to address the issues that arise
within each subject matter area. The diffuseness of the post-modern world has
created a global middle class that is displacing the nation-state as the true
interlocutor of trade. That middle class may be conceptualized as gravitating
around a number of discrete industries, each of which raises a given set of issues
on the global scale.
Consider, for example, the fashion industry. In that industry, the issues of
the day involve, first, the displacement of the means of production to the Far
East and other countries where cheap labor abounds, and second, the ability of
mass merchants and other retailers from Europe and the United States to gain
access to the emerging markets of the Far East.'09 To respond to competition,
the high-end brands are lowering their standards to tackle less luxurious markets.
The mid-range brands are being squeezed out of their markets by these luxury
brands and by the generic competition that comes from the Far East. They are
riding the tide, waiting to tackle the emerging Far East consumer markets. Thus,
industry-specific studies of the issues of the day and contextual negotiation of
108 Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, More Power to the IF/TO?, 4 J Intl Econ L 41, 44 (2001).
109 All aspects of the production of apparel, including not only manufacturing but also creation and
design, are moving from their traditional locus in such cities as New York or London to the Far
East. See Keith Bradsher, Chinese Apparel Makers Increasingly Seek the Creative Work, NY Times C1
(Aug 31, 2005). For a good example of the efforts by large US and European mass discounters to
enter emerging markets, consider the competition between Wal-Mart and Carrefour for the
Chinese market, or Wal-Mart's attempts to penetrate the Indian market. Tim Craig, Most Growth
PotenlialBeond U.S. Borders, 44 DSN Retailing Today 48 (June 13, 2005); Wal-Mart Closer to Entering
India, UPI (June 6, 2005).
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possible international regulation and projects are needed to manage the
enablement of global economic opportunity within each industry.1
As explained above, states will not go away and, in our model, they will
retain a key role in the conduct of international trade organization and
governance along such industry and issue-specific lines. In keeping with the
diffuse nature of the international marketplace, we believe the new trade
organization should be comprised of a shifting representation of states and their
governments depending on the industries at issue. The organization could have
permanent trading partners (which we will refer to as the "Trade Council") and
then delegate to responsible persons, as determined by expertise in the given
subject matter area,' who would work jointly with industry representatives and
(as explained below) other international organizations to develop appropriate
rules. By way of illustration, the trading members could be: the European Union,
the United States, Brazil or an alliance of South and Latin American States,
Australia, India, Indonesia, the Arab League, Japan, an alliance of the Southeast
Asian "tiger states," and a union of African states. These members could be
supplemented by states that are important actors in a particular industry. They
could act collectively or, if a particular issue so warranted, by vote of a subset of
states that join together in a given subject matter area." 2
110 Our proposal calls for industry-specific analysis and, in that, distinguishes itself from insightful
arguments advocating a reorganization of the WTO along issue-specific lines. Professor Guzman,
for example, argues that the WTO should "be structured along departmental lines to permit its
expansion into new areas while taming its trade bias. A department for each major issue area
would be created within the institution-a trade in goods department, a trade-in-services
department, an intellectual property department, an environmental department, and so on."
Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WITO, 45 Harv Intl L J 303, 307 (2004). We do not
intend to enter the debate over the merits of this or like proposals. Ours is a different proposition
focusing on studying, in the context of each industry, all relevant issues that will affect trade in the
post-modern, post-WTO world. Compare John 0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, Response:
Against Global Governance in the IVTO, 45 Harv Intl L J 353 (2004) (critiquing Guzman's proposal
on the grounds, in part, that it would create a "world government" that raises intractable
theoretical and practical problems, and arguing that the WTO should stick to its original goals of
eliminating protectionist barriers to trade among states).
111 Delegating to government officials based on expertise has been tried in Europe, where the
Council sits with ministers from different subject matter areas based on the issue at hand. See, for
example, Mario Te16, Dimocratie Internationale et Dimocratie Supranationale en Europe 37-42, in Mario
Tel6, ed, Dimocratie et Construction Europienne (Editions de l'Universit6 de Bruxelles 1995).
112 The extent to which the new institutions will adhere to a power based rather than rules based
regime will evolve over time, in leaps and bounds, as has been the case with other organizations
and polities such as the WTO or EU. The balance between "exit" and "voice," which Professor
Weiler articulated in his seminal article on the transformation of Europe, and that has guided
insightful analysis of the WTO and other organizations, will continue to provide a powerful lens
to analyze the institutional issues bound to arise in the trade organizations of the future. These
will include the extent to which states are bound by rules that others have voted in over their
objection, whether they can be compelled to account for violations, whether dispute resolution
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In each instance, the Trade Council would establish programs designed to
create the conditions necessary for enablement of global economic opportunity.
Consistent with diffuseness and post-modern Statecraft, the Trade Council
would coordinate with other international institutions. In the fashion industry
example discussed above, the Trade Council could coordinate with the
International Labor Organization. This type of "external cooperation," which
some scholars of trade advocate, would be in line with the diffuse nature of the
post-modern world."3
In addition, the Trade Council could determine which issue areas (beyond
the traditional areas dealt with by the WTO) are good candidates for
regulation.1 4 The norm of enablement of global economic opportunity carries in
its penumbra other norms, such as anti-corruption rules, that could be more
effectively enforced by cooperation between the Trade Council and, say, the
International Criminal Court or ad hoc tribunals."' Likewise, the Trade Council
could coordinate with central banks and other financial institutions or
organizations to address financial and monetary issues taking into account
industry-specific concerns. For example, the recent fall of the dollar," 6 if met
with the inability or unwillingness of the traditional domestic institutions to stem
the tide, could deeply unsettle the trade world. Europe could lose substantial
market share in the United States. Chinese products, priced principally in dollars,
could become even cheaper than they are now, and perhaps more importantly,
the Chinese consumer could lose a substantial amount of buying power vis-a-vis
its European partners. These issues, however, cannot be considered exhaustively
without a study of their impact on trade in various industries. While international
will be accessible to non-state actors, and the numerous other issues inherent in building an
international framework that integrates constituent states, whatever the current state of their
Statecraft. J.H.H. Weiler, The Tranformation of Europe, 100 Yale L J 2403 (1991). See also J.
Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 Mich L Rev 1 (2005). Our goal today is to
articulate a general direction-a way that we believe trade is bound to take either by considered
policy choice or when historical forces make it virtually inevitable. We are opening a door, not
attempting to lay down the comprehensive framework of the future.
113 See, for example, Bronckers, 4 J Intl Econ L at 49 (cited in note 108).
114 Scholars have advocated tests, in the context of the WTO, for determining which issues are
appropriate subject matters for trade regulation. See, for example, Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in
the World Trade OrganiZahion: Discerning the Limits of the World Trade OrganiZation's Authoiy, 28 NYU J
Intl L & Pol 711, 714 (1996).
115 Clearly, this is because corruption and transnational bribery could hamper development projects
such as those described below, or otherwise hinder the spread of economic opportunity to private
economic actors.
116 Mark A. Stein, Export Opportunities Aren'tJustfor the Big Giys, NY Times C8 (Mar 24, 2005).
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institutions and mechanisms already exist to handle those questions,1 7 the
obvious linkage between trade and financial and monetary matters would, in
today's diffuse world, make it logical for the Trade Council to turn its attention
to international coordination, information sharing, and possibly joint norms,
again on an ad hoc basis.
The type of economic development fostered by this new trade institution
will also be in line with the diffuse world of the twenty-first century. The
twentieth century's Marshall Plan was intended to shore up nation-states so that
a trading world with a relative balance of powers could be established. We
believe that twenty-first century trade will also require a Marshall Plan-like
investment to complement trade, though one that is of a more modest, gradual,
and ad hoc nature in line with the pushing and prodding of economic activity
that characterizes the trade norm that we advocate. The Trade Council we
envision would coordinate with regional and other development banks, and
other institutions, to promote economic, educational, and infrastructural
investment. It would work to shift industries of the type now spreading to
modern societies such as India or Brazil to pre-modern societies, and generally
spread economic opportunity where it is most needed. It could also, in
coordination with other international institutions, implement proposals such as
that advanced by Jeffrey Sachs to combat poverty in the most pre-modern of
collectivities.'
Our proposed shift in the trade world should be marked by a constitutional
moment. Unlike Bretton Woods, it would anticipate the historical tide before
change is forced upon us (possibly in an atmosphere of crisis). Rather than a
"North" and a "South," we are faced today with diffuse blocs that cut across
traditional borders, coexist within borders, and form the new stage of our
political and economic evolution. From inward-looking and outward conquest
(in the pre-modern era), to collaboration and the creation of a balanced bloc of
sovereign nations in the North (during the modern era), we have entered into a
dynamic world where North, South, and the former communist bloc blend to
create a diffuse society of post-modern states lying side by side with, and
containing within themselves, pre-modern societies." 9  The fundamental
challenge of the post-modern society of states will be to preserve a world where
the trading blocs across the world continue to grow and to contain
countervailing forces-chief among them terrorism, the conduct of asymmetric
117 See, for example, Sydney J. Key, Trade Liberalization and Prudential Regulation: The International
Framework for Financial Services 75 Intl Affairs 61 (1999). See also Robert Gilpin, Global Political
Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order 218-77 (Princeton 2001).
118 See Sachs, The End of Povert at 226-338 (cited in note 95).
119 See note 95. See also Cooper, The Breaking of Nations (cited in note 8).
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war (especially economic warfare) through terror, and the takeover of a nuclear
state by rogue forces. The strategic importance of consolidating a Northern bloc
of liberal democracies is no longer at the top of the agenda. If trade, as the outer
face of the state, is to follow the inner constitutional order of post-modern
societies, and also to further the states' foreign strategic goals, a constitutional
moment must reconfigure the inner constitutional order to accept that the
twenty-first century principal commercial interlocutors are the cross-border,
diffuse trading classes of the world.
Unlike Bretton Woods, the constitutional moment of the twenty-first
century will not usher in a comprehensive regulatory framework dedicated to
achieving a norm,1 20 but will mark a bifurcation of the international trade order
into two distinct parts: the completion of the comparative advantage enterprise
within the umbrella of the WTO and its negotiating rounds2 and the
enablement of global economic opportunity through institutions of the type we
advocate. A constitutional moment, in the form of a conference akin to the
Bretton Woods gathering, should formalize and mark the passage to the
redirection of trade. At that conference, the Trade Council would be established
and a broad document acknowledging the new trade norm adopted. However,
rather than a comprehensive regulatory framework such as the GATT, the
conference would merely establish an umbrella framework out of which future
regulation and projects would arise. The post-modern world is not only diffuse,
it also generates issues of such complexity and magnitude as to make it
impossible to establish ex ante a comprehensive normative framework to
effectuate the enablement of global economic opportunity. In such
circumstances, the system should set in motion a framework for adopting ad hoc
regulation and projects. In other words, adopting the norm, and putting in place
the institutions that will further it, will allow for the exact normative contours of
the system of the future to take shape and grow in leaps and bounds, based on
the actual evolution of an international marketplace still in a state of flux.
IV. CONCLUSION
Once the global collectivity sets in motion a new trade order of states, it
will have triggered a new cycle which, like Bretton Woods, will generate novel
substantive and institutional issues and, over time, transform Statecraft, undergo
additional metamorphoses of its own, and ultimately give rise to another
120 Of course, in addition to legal principles that remained in place throughout the system's existence,
Bretton Woods introduced a framework for future negotiations of tariff reduction.
121 Obviously, the outcome of the Doha Round of negotiations, whether it succeeds or fails, will be a
key factor shaping the future of this branch of trade because of its emphasis on the removal of
subsidies and other impediments to market access by developing countries.
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constitutional era. History in fact never ends, but it pauses sufficiently for each
generation to recognize its place in the evolutionary path, and to organize its law,
international order, and institutions to reflect the needs of the present.
In this Article, we have identified constitutional mechanisms that affect
Statecraft, the order of states, and transformative and evolutionary patterns that
are borne out of this constitutional interaction. Further, we have articulated what
we believe to be the seminal contours of the constitutional order of the early
twenty-first century. Today's challenge is to build a system for coming
generations, keeping in mind that when we take on the unavoidable task of
transforming the current order we also plant the seeds of an equally inevitable
future constitutional metamorphosis.
It goes without saying that further study, thought, and analysis will go into
creating the architecture, framework, and construction of the new system.
Experts in each industry will identify the salient needs of the actors operating in
their field and inform policy-makers and negotiators of the choices that face
them. Finance and currency thinkers will study the transformed international
and domestic landscape and produce the nuts and bolts of the new order.
Institutional theorists will analyze the various means of breathing life into the
new norms through transformed institutions. To be sure, the current WTO
system will continue to operate with comparative advantage as a central norm of
trade. 122 However, we believe that history will continue to call upon us to
bifurcate the trade story and focus on how best to spread global economic
opportunity.
The new order will not arise overnight. When Robert Schuman declared
his vision of a constitutionally transformed Europe, he pointedly prophesized
that Europe would be built through a series of "concrete achievements" which,
over time, would yield the new legal order that he visualized in 1950 as the
"United States of Europe.' ' 123 The interaction of the various European
institutions, the resolution of crises such as the Luxembourg constitutional
breakdown of the 1960s, and the random workings of the political process have
infused the system with an element of randomness on the road to acceptance by
122 Changes may have to be made on the WTO's front as well to reflect the transformed nature of
the State. This could constitute a revision of the rules of origin, balance of payments, and other
provisions that were devised for a nation-state centric system. Further, whether or not Doha is
successful, in the long run the WTO may (by hook or by crook) achieve its integration purpose
and complete the removal of barriers to trade. In all events, though, the WTO and its institutions
will continuously be called upon to administer the relationship between international and
domestic norms and to adjudicate the interpretative issues of the day.
123 See Pascal Fontaine, A New Idea for Europe: The Schuman Declaralion 1950-2000 (European
Communities 2000).
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the constituent entities. The same animating principles will occur in the
international order of states that we envision.
The future evolution of states and trade will surely face setbacks, if not
crises. But by paying heed to the evolving course of history, we stand a greater
chance of steering it towards a better course. No doubt, we will continue to
struggle with poverty, violence, terror, inequalities, catastrophes, and all the
other permanent attributes of the human condition. However, by recognizing
the fundamental mechanisms that drive our domestic and international orders,
we will have done all we can to organize ourselves as best as possible to face an
uncertain future.
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